Copyright expert witness fees can add substantially to the cost of resolving an infringement dispute. Experts may be needed to address technical or specialized issues, yet the rules for recovering their fees from an opposing party are unsettled. The central question is whether Section 505 of the Copyright Act, which allows courts to award “full costs,” authorizes a court to shift expert fees to the losing party.
The answer matters to both sides. A potential plaintiff may weigh expected litigation costs against the relief available, while a defendant may consider whether the expense of a defense could ultimately be recovered. Federal courts have reached different conclusions about the scope of Section 505, leaving outcomes dependent, in part, on the circuit where a case is heard.
How cost shifting works in copyright cases
The general rule in U.S. litigation is that each party pays its own legal fees unless a statute, contract, or recognized exception provides otherwise. The Copyright Act creates a statutory exception. Under Section 505, a court may, in its discretion, award “full costs” to or against a party and may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party.
This framework is intended to apply without automatically favoring copyright owners over defendants. In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., the Supreme Court rejected a special standard that would make awards easier for prevailing plaintiffs than for prevailing defendants. The Court reasoned that meritorious claims and meritorious defenses can both advance copyright law’s aims. A successful defense, for example, may help preserve public access to a work.
Costs and attorney’s fees are distinct. Attorney’s fees compensate counsel for legal services; costs generally cover litigation-related expenditures paid to third parties. Section 505’s discretion over costs does not, by itself, resolve which expenses qualify for reimbursement.
Taxable costs and expert witness fees
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) creates a general presumption that a prevailing party may recover costs, subject to the court’s discretion and applicable law. The costs ordinarily available under this rule are defined by federal statutes, principally 28 U.S.C. Sections 1920 and 1821. These provisions cover specified items, including certain court fees, transcripts, copying expenses, and witness attendance and travel expenses.
Expert witnesses may receive the statutory witness fees, but those amounts do not necessarily cover the broader compensation associated with specialized expertise, such as time spent reviewing materials or preparing and giving testimony. Those additional amounts are commonly described as nontaxable costs because they are not included in the statutory list of recoverable costs.
The Supreme Court has held that Sections 1920 and 1821 set the limits on cost shifting unless Congress clearly authorizes courts to go further. In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., the Court required “plain evidence” of congressional intent to allow costs beyond those statutes. Later decisions, including West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey and Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, reinforced that broad references to costs or attorney’s fees do not necessarily authorize recovery of expert fees.
Why courts disagree about “full costs”
Section 505’s distinctive phrase—“full costs”—has led to different readings. Some courts have concluded that limiting recovery to costs listed in Sections 1920 and 1821 would leave the word “full” with little effect. On that view, the Copyright Act’s language can support awards of certain nontaxable expenses, including expert witness fees.
Other courts have reasoned that “full costs” is not sufficiently explicit to override the general limits set by federal cost statutes. Because Section 505 does not specifically mention expert fees, these courts have declined to treat its language as clear congressional authorization for shifting them.
The result is a circuit split. Decisions in the Ninth Circuit have permitted expert-fee awards under Section 505, while other appellate courts have rejected that approach. A prevailing party may therefore face different rules depending on where the case is litigated. The potential difference is significant: an award may include substantial expert expenses in one jurisdiction but exclude those expenses in another.
Courts may also impose expert-fee sanctions under their inherent authority when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. But this is a demanding standard, not a routine alternative for recovering ordinary expert costs. Parties should not assume that prevailing in a copyright dispute, by itself, will make their expert expenses recoverable.
Practical considerations for litigants
For copyright owners, defendants, and their advisers, uncertainty around expert witness cost recovery should be part of early litigation planning. Relevant questions include:
- Which federal circuit’s interpretation of Section 505 will govern the case?
- What expert work is likely to be needed, and what expenses may fall outside statutory witness fees?
- How could an unrecoverable expert bill affect the overall economics of pursuing a claim or defense?
- Does the case raise conduct that could support a sanctions request, rather than an ordinary cost award?
These questions do not determine whether a claim or defense is legally sound. They help clarify the financial risks of litigating it and the limits of relying on a potential award of costs.
Conclusion: clarity may require congressional action
The competing interpretations of “full costs” leave parties without a consistent nationwide answer on copyright expert witness fees. The legal framework establishes limits on ordinary cost recovery, while Section 505’s wording has prompted some courts to recognize a broader award. The article’s central conclusion is that existing law does not provide sufficiently clear authority for routine recovery of expert fees under Section 505.
Because expert testimony can be important in copyright litigation, Congress could address the uncertainty by amending Section 505 to expressly permit courts to award expert witness fees at their discretion. Until then, litigants should account for the possibility that those expenses will remain their responsibility, even if they prevail.