Radioactive material security is a lifecycle responsibility. Sources used in medicine, industry, research, education, food and agriculture must remain under appropriate control during use, storage and transport—and when they are no longer needed. That requires more than facility-level physical protection: regulators, operators, law enforcement and other national partners need clear responsibilities and workable arrangements for prevention, detection and response.
Experience presented at the 2018 International Conference on the Security of Radioactive Material illustrates both the progress countries can make and the practical issues that remain. Bangladesh’s approach offers a useful example of how regulatory development, source management and international support can contribute to a stronger national security regime.
Radioactive material security starts with clear oversight
A security program depends on knowing who regulates sources, who is responsible for them and what requirements apply. In Bangladesh, the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control Act was enacted in 1993, followed by rules in 1997 that made a security system a requirement for licensing. The Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority (BAERA), established in 2013 under the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Act, oversees the safe and peaceful use of atomic energy.
The conference synopsis describes licensees as responsible for radiation safety, radiation protection, physical protection and emergency preparedness across a facility’s lifecycle, including siting, operation and decommissioning. Their responsibilities also extend to sources during import, export, transport and storage. This makes regulatory clarity important not only at fixed facilities, but wherever sources change custody or location.
Bangladesh’s earlier rules remained in force while further regulations were being developed under the newer legal framework. The account also identified the need to incorporate relevant international recommendations and the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Such updates matter because requirements need to support consistent implementation, verification and enforcement—not simply exist on paper.
Build control around an accurate source inventory
Effective oversight requires reliable information about sources and their status. Bangladesh’s regulator maintains an inventory of radioactive materials and requires licensees to manage unused sources. Inventory control helps authorities and operators keep track of materials that are in use, stored or awaiting disposition, and supports action when a source is no longer required.
Disused sources deserve particular attention. They may remain radioactive even after the equipment or process for which they were acquired has been retired. Bangladesh’s synopsis describes the Central Radioactive Waste Processing and Storage Facility, operated by the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission, as the country’s authorized national facility for radioactive waste transportation and management. Sources recovered from devices and disused radium-226 sources collected from medical, industrial and research institutions were stored there.
Centralized management can provide a defined route for sources that would otherwise remain at facilities without a continuing use. However, safe and secure storage is only one part of end-of-life management. The synopsis identifies the need to develop qualified personnel and capabilities for processing, conditioning and managing disused sources, as well as long-term storage or disposal options for higher-category sources. It also notes that the national radioactive waste management policy was awaiting government approval.
Connect prevention with detection and response
Physical protection at a facility and detection at borders address different parts of the security challenge. Bangladesh has worked with international partners to develop physical protection systems at facilities. The country’s Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan has also supported efforts to strengthen the wider regime, with development of a national detection strategy identified as a priority. The U.S. Megaports initiative was described as helping control illicit trafficking of radioactive materials.
Examples from Viet Nam show how detection infrastructure can complement facility measures. The conference synopsis reports that radiation portal monitors were installed at Noi Bai International Airport and at three seaports, with the systems operating from 2014. Detection equipment was also installed for Da Nang International Airport. These deployments formed part of broader efforts that included physical protection improvements, training and an integrated nuclear security support plan.
Detection equipment is only one element of an effective arrangement. Authorities need procedures for assessing alarms and coordinating the response. Cooperation between regulatory bodies, customs, police and other relevant organizations helps connect a detection event to appropriate follow-up. The conference program’s focus on border procedures, law-enforcement relationships and inter-agency response reflects this operational requirement.
Invest in people, cooperation and sustainable capability
Equipment and regulations must be supported by people who can implement them. Bangladesh’s reported training activities covered radiological security awareness, physical protection system management, and the search for, securing and recovery of orphan sources. The country also supported the development of expertise through international cooperation and training opportunities for young scientists.
Training needs to address the full range of responsibilities, from facility security and transport to responding when sources are discovered outside regulatory control. The Bangladesh synopsis highlights hands-on exercises for orphan-source search and securing as an outstanding need. It also points to shortages of qualified personnel for disused-source management and the need for adequate infrastructure for interim storage.
International cooperation can help address gaps in expertise, equipment and source disposition. Bangladesh’s work with the IAEA, the United States, Japan and the Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia was described as contributing to security capabilities. A separate conference case study on source repatriation showed how a government program, an industry partner and a national organization cooperated to disassemble devices, consolidate sources and return U.S.-origin sources to the United States. The example underlines that source disposition may require specialist capabilities and careful coordination across organizations and borders.
Turn security commitments into a sustainable system
For plant managers, operators and technical decision-makers, the practical message is to treat security as part of routine source management—not as a measure limited to facility entry points. Maintain accurate records, clarify responsibility for each source, plan for secure storage and transport, and establish a route for unused or disused material. Regulators and national stakeholders, in turn, need to align licensing, inspection, detection and response arrangements.
A sustainable radioactive material security regime brings these elements together: clear rules, accountable licensees, reliable source control, suitable storage, trained personnel, effective detection and coordinated response. International assistance can support progress, but long-term performance depends on national institutions and operators being able to maintain the systems and capabilities they put in place.