Cyber threat response is not solely a matter of investigating individual attackers. Malicious activity can involve criminal groups, state-sponsored actors, compromised devices, data theft and attacks on critical infrastructure. For industrial organizations, the broader lesson is that cybersecurity depends on coordinated action: companies, government agencies and international partners may each hold information or capabilities needed to address an incident.
The U.S. Department of Justice’s 2019 review of its cyber work describes an approach built around coordination, multiple forms of intervention and partnerships with the private sector. While the review focuses on law enforcement rather than industrial control systems, its central themes are relevant to organizations that operate or support critical infrastructure: prepare to work across organizational boundaries, consider more than one measure of success, and treat incident response as an ongoing process.
Cyber threats do not fit neatly into one category
Cyber activity is better understood as a set of techniques than as a single type of crime or a discrete organizational mission. Similar methods may be used by lone individuals, organized criminal groups or nation-state actors, but their objectives can differ. The same techniques may affect privacy, business operations, public safety or national security.
This variety creates a coordination challenge. An incident may concern multiple government responsibilities, while relevant evidence or infrastructure sits with a private company. The DOJ account describes an approach in which different divisions and agencies coordinate rather than treating cyber matters as belonging to only one area. For industrial operators, the practical implication is that an incident may require engagement across internal teams and external organizations, depending on what has happened and who is affected.
That coordination should not be confused with a single, universal response plan. The appropriate participants and actions depend on the circumstances. The underlying principle is to make sure that the people responsible for operational recovery, investigation, security and relevant legal or policy decisions can work together.
Cyber threat response extends beyond prosecution
Holding offenders accountable is one important objective, but prosecution alone cannot address every active threat. The DOJ review also describes the use of civil and administrative authorities, including court-authorized actions to seize servers or domain names associated with cybercriminal activity. Such actions can disrupt infrastructure even when the people operating it cannot immediately be identified or apprehended.
The review’s account of the VPN Filter botnet illustrates this broader approach. The FBI and other government partners worked to obtain court authorization for a response involving private-sector cooperation, while also working with nonprofit organizations to publicize the threat. The operation disrupted the malware and supported efforts to identify and remediate affected devices. The example shows that a response can aim to limit ongoing harm, not only to build a case for prosecution.
For industrial organizations, this distinction matters when evaluating incident outcomes. An investigation may take time, and an identified attacker may be beyond immediate reach. Containing an active threat, helping affected parties recover and reducing the chance of further victimization are also meaningful response objectives. The DOJ example does not prescribe specific controls for industrial systems; it demonstrates how coordinated action and disruption can complement enforcement.
Public-private cooperation is essential
Private companies often hold information relevant to cyber incidents, and attackers may use privately operated services or infrastructure as part of their activity. Government agencies, in turn, may have investigative authorities and capabilities that private organizations do not. The DOJ account presents cooperation as a two-way exchange: companies can provide threat information that helps authorities investigate, while government agencies may help victims understand an attack and pursue actions to disrupt malicious activity.
Cooperation can be complicated because companies may occupy several roles at once. A provider might hold data relevant to an investigation, be a victim of an attack, or operate infrastructure misused by an attacker. This makes clear communication and an understanding of responsibilities important. For plant operators and system integrators, it is useful to know in advance who within the organization coordinates external communications and how incident information is handled.
The DOJ review also distinguishes between two forms of government assistance in a cyber incident. “Asset response” is described as helping a victim recover and return to normal operations, while “threat response” involves investigative work intended to identify malicious activity and deter it. These functions may involve different agencies. Organizations should therefore avoid assuming that one point of contact or one response activity covers every need.
International coordination adds another layer
Cyber investigations can cross national borders, while the relevant data, actors and infrastructure may be located in different jurisdictions. The DOJ review describes efforts to build international capacity through legal and investigative training, as well as participation in multilateral frameworks such as the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.
International cooperation is not only an operational issue. The review also emphasizes that countries may have different approaches to Internet governance and information security. Those differences can affect how international norms develop and how agencies cooperate. For industrial businesses operating across borders, this reinforces the value of understanding that incident response may involve multiple legal and institutional contexts.
Practical implications for industrial organizations
The DOJ’s account suggests several broad considerations for organizations connected to critical infrastructure:
- Plan for coordination. Identify who is responsible for internal decisions and external communications during a cyber incident.
- Consider response objectives beyond attribution. Recovery and disruption of ongoing malicious activity can matter even when an investigation has not identified an attacker.
- Prepare to engage with external partners. Private-sector information sharing and government assistance can contribute different capabilities to a response.
- Expect complexity. Cyber incidents can cross organizational boundaries and involve criminal, national-security or other concerns.
These are planning principles, not a substitute for organization-specific procedures or technical safeguards. The appropriate response depends on the incident, the affected organization and the relevant authorities.
Conclusion: Treat response as a coordinated effort
Cyber threats are varied, adaptive and difficult to address through a single tool. The DOJ review makes the case for combining investigation and prosecution with disruption, recovery support and partnerships across government, industry and international organizations. Industrial operators can take away a practical message: effective cyber threat response requires clear coordination and a focus on limiting harm, even while the facts of an incident are still being established.