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The China-U.S. trade agreement illustrates a central challenge in trade policy: a deal that reduces tensions between two major economies can still impose costs on other trading partners. For developing economies, the outcome depends less on the stated goal of expanding trade than on how China implements its import commitments. Preferential access for U.S. suppliers can redirect purchases away from other exporters, while non-discriminatory market opening offers a different path.

A World Bank analysis of the agreement’s Phase 1 commitments used a global computable general equilibrium model to compare these outcomes. Its findings highlight why trade diversion, import targets and the design of market access matter to exporters, policymakers and businesses connected to global supply chains.

Why implementation shapes the impact of the China-U.S. trade agreement

The agreement set targets for China to increase purchases of U.S. goods and services. Unlike a conventional preferential trade agreement, which typically focuses on reducing trade barriers across a broad range of areas, this deal placed significant emphasis on specific purchase commitments. The analysis describes this approach as managed trade: using targeted outcomes to influence the volume and origin of imports.

China could meet its commitments in different ways. It could grant U.S. suppliers preferential access to a market that remains protected, or it could reduce barriers for imports from all trading partners. These choices have different consequences for China, the United States and countries that already export to the Chinese market.

The agreement also differed from many U.S. trade agreements in its limited scope and its emphasis on specific actions to expand U.S. market access. It covered areas including intellectual property, technology transfers, agriculture, financial services and macroeconomic policies. Its dispute process relied on bilateral consultations rather than an independent adjudication mechanism. For third countries, the central economic concern was that targeted access could shift trade without creating general, non-discriminatory liberalization.

How import targets can create trade diversion

An import target is not the same as removing a trade barrier. If a product is already freely traded, a government may need to subsidize purchases to ensure that imports reach a specified level. The subsidy can be explicit, or its cost can be borne indirectly—for example, by a state-owned enterprise. In either case, the target can distort production and consumption, creating costs for the importing country and reducing overall global welfare.

Where tariffs or other barriers restrict trade, additional imports can benefit both the importer and exporter. But the analysis argues that reducing those barriers is generally a more efficient way to expand trade than imposing a quantitative target. Lower barriers allow market conditions to determine how much is traded, while a fixed target can create pressure to meet a prescribed volume even as demand or other economic conditions change.

Discrimination adds another effect. If China gives U.S. goods preferential treatment, Chinese buyers may switch from suppliers in other countries to U.S. suppliers. This trade diversion can harm third-country exporters, even when the total volume of trade increases. The impact on China is less certain: imports from the United States might replace less efficient domestic production, or they might displace more efficient suppliers elsewhere.

What the model scenarios indicate for developing economies

The simulations compared managed trade with a policy status quo, an escalation of the trade war and non-discriminatory liberalization. These are modeled scenarios, not forecasts of what necessarily occurred. Their value lies in showing how the distribution of gains and losses changes with implementation.

  • Compared with the policy status quo: Managed trade raised modeled U.S. income by 0.91 percent in 2021, while China’s income fell by 0.38 percent. Income in the rest of the world declined by 0.17 percent, and income in the world excluding the United States and China fell by 0.16 percent. East Asia and the Pacific excluding China and Latin America were among the regions facing losses, reflecting their existing export exposure to the Chinese market.
  • Compared with an escalated trade war: The agreement improved the modeled outcomes for China and the United States, but the rest of the world was worse off than under the trade-war scenario. Third-country exporters lost some of the relative advantage they had gained when U.S.-China tariffs rose.
  • Compared with managed trade: If China instead reduced tariffs and non-tariff barriers on a non-discriminatory basis, modeled global income was 0.37 percent higher in 2021. China’s income was 0.46 percent higher, and the rest of the world excluding the United States and China gained 0.63 percent. The United States and Mexico had lower income in this comparison than under managed trade.

The sectoral implications varied. The paper identified potential exposure for agricultural exporters in Brazil and Argentina, as well as for manufacturing suppliers such as Japan, Germany, Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia. Energy exporters, including Australia, Russia and Angola, could also face competition in China. These examples reflect the study’s modeled trade patterns; they do not mean that every exporter in a listed country would experience the same effect.

Practical implications for trade and supply-chain decisions

For companies and policymakers, the analysis underscores the importance of looking beyond headline purchase commitments. A shift in sourcing toward one favored supplier can affect competing exporters, input flows and market opportunities across regions. Businesses exposed to China-bound agricultural, manufacturing or energy trade may therefore need to consider how changes in market access could alter competition, not just aggregate import demand.

The broader policy lesson is that the method used to expand trade matters. Quantitative targets can create uncertainty about which products and suppliers will be selected, while preferential treatment can redirect demand rather than improve access for all. Reducing trade barriers across partners provides a more market-based route to increased imports and can limit discriminatory effects.

Conclusion

The China-U.S. trade agreement could avert a worse outcome for its two signatories relative to an escalated trade war, yet still leave developing economies and other trading partners facing losses compared with the policy status quo. The model’s alternative scenario points to a broader opportunity: China meeting its import commitments through non-discriminatory liberalization could produce higher modeled incomes for China and much of the rest of the world. For trade-dependent businesses and governments, the practical takeaway is to assess not only how much a market imports, but also whether access is open to all suppliers.

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