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Counterfeit integrated circuits can create problems that extend well beyond the cost of replacing a failed component. In industrial, aerospace, and defense systems, an unreliable IC may contribute to poor product performance, field failures, recalls, lost operating time, and damage to a manufacturer’s reputation. Reducing the risk requires more than a single inspection or test: organizations need controls that address both how components are sourced and how they are verified.

How counterfeit ICs enter the supply chain

Counterfeit components may originate in discarded electronic equipment. A common laundering cycle begins when printed circuit boards (PCBs) are collected for recycling. ICs are removed, processed, and made to resemble new original components. They may then be resold as genuine parts, installed on production PCBs, and incorporated into systems that ultimately enter service.

Refurbishing can involve removing original markings, resurfacing a component, and applying new markings—a practice often called “blacktopping.” The resulting IC may look legitimate even though it is used, discarded, or otherwise not what the buyer ordered. Counterfeiting can also involve cloned parts: devices made to imitate the appearance or function of an authentic component. These more advanced counterfeits add to the challenge of verifying parts through appearance alone.

The risk can be greater when a component is difficult to source through normal channels. A 2016 Homeland Security Investigation study cited in the source material found that discontinued components accounted for 66.90% of the legacy-system impacts it examined. Active components accounted for 18.92%, followed by transferred technology at 9.81%, components designated NRFND (Not Ready For New Design) at 3.1%, and end-of-life components at 1.2%. These figures illustrate why parts shortages and long-lived systems deserve attention in supply-chain planning.

Why counterfeit integrated circuits are a serious risk

Counterfeit ICs can have uncertain histories and may not perform consistently. A component that passes a basic visual check can still be used, improperly refurbished, or inconsistent with its claimed identity. If such a part is installed in a critical system, the consequences may include equipment malfunction or failure. In sectors where reliability is essential, the impact can reach beyond the individual component or circuit board.

A federal case involving PRB Logics illustrates how counterfeits can move through the supply chain. The company’s owner was sentenced in 2019 for trafficking in counterfeit military goods. According to the source, old and discarded ICs were refurbished and remarked, while test reports were manipulated to conceal failed tests. The parts were sold to U.S. customers, including defense contractors, and ultimately reached a classified Air Force program. The case also demonstrates that paperwork alone cannot establish authenticity when the integrity of the testing and sourcing process is in doubt.

The source material also describes counterfeit components identified in military and government-related applications, including a failed Naval destroyer training launch, a Coast Guard helicopter communications array, and the LANTIRN program for F-14 Tomcats. These examples underscore the need to treat component authenticity as a reliability and system-integrity concern, not simply a purchasing issue.

Why detection remains a moving target

Counterfeiters adapt as inspection and test methods improve. Parts may be altered to resemble legitimate products, and published countermeasures can give bad actors clues about how to evade detection. The source notes that SAE standard AS6171 was released in late 2016, but that counterfeiting techniques had already evolved to defeat it by the end of that year. No single test should therefore be treated as a permanent or complete solution.

Enforcement activity also reflects the scale of the challenge. Operation Chain Reaction, a coordinated initiative led by Homeland Security Investigations and the Intellectual Property Rights Center with 16 federal law-enforcement agencies, reported 24 criminal investigations, 15 arrests, 18 indictments, seven convictions, and 68 counterfeit-goods seizure incidents worth approximately $4.9 million in fiscal year 2018. Enforcement can disrupt illegal activity, but organizations still need controls at the point of procurement and receipt.

Building a prevention and detection program

Effective counterfeit IC mitigation combines prevention with detection. Prevention reduces the likelihood that suspect components enter the organization; detection helps identify questionable parts that may still arrive.

Strengthen prevention at the sourcing stage

  • Use authorized suppliers wherever possible. Integrating approved sources into a controlled supply chain reduces exposure to unknown intermediaries.
  • Apply a consistent receiving inspection. A strong visual inspection regime can identify visible inconsistencies and trigger further review. Visual inspection should be part of a broader process rather than the sole basis for acceptance.
  • Retain a verified reference item. Acquiring a certified first-production-run component directly from the original chip manufacturer can provide a reference for comparison with later deliveries.

Use testing to investigate authenticity

Destructive testing (DT) can expose markings or features inside a package, including on the die. Because the test destroys the component, it is a one-time examination and cannot be applied to every part that must remain available for production.

Non-destructive testing (NDT) offers another route for routine screening. The source describes fixtures with a library of IC signatures that can be used to compare devices and learn new signatures. NDT preserves the tested component, but it cannot guarantee that every counterfeit will be detected. Testing methods should be selected and applied as part of a defined quality process, with appropriate follow-up when results raise concerns.

Make supply-chain controls and testing work together

There is no guaranteed way to catch every counterfeit with non-destructive testing, while testing every component destructively would leave no parts available for use. The practical response is layered risk management: source through controlled channels, inspect incoming components, maintain trustworthy reference items, and use suitable testing to investigate authenticity.

For engineers, integrators, and operations leaders, counterfeit prevention is a shared supply-chain and quality responsibility. Strong sourcing practices reduce opportunities for counterfeit ICs to enter production; inspection and testing provide additional checks when components arrive. Together, these measures offer a more robust defense than relying on any single supplier document, visual check, or test method.

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