Cybersecurity certification can give industrial automation teams a more consistent way to evaluate the security of technology used in critical infrastructure. A 2020 Senate amendment proposed a voluntary national certification and labeling program for critical information and communications technology. The proposal is not, by itself, evidence that such a program became law; it describes a policy framework that is useful to examine when considering how security claims, evaluations and product information might be organized.
For engineers, system integrators and operations leaders, the central idea is straightforward: make security attributes easier to assess and communicate, while defining processes for evaluating products against identified standards, frameworks and benchmarks. The amendment focuses on critical technology that supports national critical functions, as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
What the proposed cybersecurity certification program would do
The amendment calls for a National Cybersecurity Certification and Labeling Authority to administer a voluntary program. Its remit would include coordinating the identification and harmonization of security standards, frameworks and benchmarks for critical information and communications technology. The proposal names the Departments of Commerce and Homeland Security, along with experts from government, academia, nonprofit organizations and the private sector, as participants in this work.
The program would also establish a process for nongovernmental organizations to apply to become accredited certifying agents. An accredited agent could certify a specific class of technology, while the Authority could issue certifications itself or permit accredited agents to do so. This structure separates the development of program rules from the work of evaluating products, while requiring agents to be accredited for the relevant technology class.
In an industrial setting, the framework could be relevant when evaluating technology that forms part of operational or information systems supporting critical functions. The proposal does not specify a particular list of automation products or prescribe a single technical test. Instead, it describes a process for selecting criteria and communicating how a product meets them.
Three proposed certification classes
The amendment specifies at least three classes of certification, distinguishing the basis on which a security claim would be supported:
- Attestation-based certification: Manufacturers or service providers attest that their products or services meet the program’s certification criteria.
- Accreditation-based certification: A product has undergone a security evaluation and testing process by a qualifying third party.
- Test-based certification: A product has also undergone security evaluation and testing by a qualifying third party, with the class identified separately in the proposal.
These categories matter because a certificate is only as informative as the process behind it. A supplier attestation and an independent evaluation are not identical forms of evidence. For procurement teams, understanding which certification class applies would be essential before using a label to compare products or inform risk decisions. The amendment does not define the detailed test procedures for each class; it directs the Authority to develop or allow accredited agents to develop criteria based on the selected standards and benchmarks.
Labels as a route to clearer product information
Certification addresses whether a product meets specified criteria; labeling is intended to make relevant information visible and understandable. The proposed Authority would work with the private sector to standardize label language and create a schema describing security characteristics and constituent components of covered software or hardware. It would also establish a mechanism for developers to provide this information for labels and public posting.
For automation professionals, a clear label could help organize questions during supplier assessment, such as what security attributes are being represented and which components are included in the disclosure. The proposal defines a label broadly as an easy-to-understand visual symbol or list conveying information about a product’s security attributes, characteristics, functionality, components or other features. It does not prescribe a particular label design or guarantee that a labeled product is secure in every operating environment.
The Authority would also publicly display certified technology and its certification information, and conduct outreach to improve awareness. Such a registry, if implemented as described, would make it possible to consult certification details rather than relying solely on marketing language. The proposal’s stated approach emphasizes communication and public access, not a replacement for an organization’s own security review.
Maintaining confidence in certification
Under the amendment, certifications would remain valid for one year from issuance. The Authority would remove a certification if a manufacturer fell out of conformity with the applicable standards, frameworks or benchmarks. These provisions point to a certification model that depends on continued conformity, rather than treating an initial evaluation as permanent.
The proposal also identifies prohibited conduct, including falsely attesting to a security standard, falsifying an audit or test, intentionally mislabeling a product, or failing to maintain a standard to which a person attested. Violations would be treated as unfair or deceptive acts or practices for enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission. These measures are intended to give the label and certification process credibility, although the amendment itself does not establish a detailed technical surveillance or retesting schedule beyond the annual certification validity period.
Governance is another part of the proposed model. The Secretary of Commerce, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, would select a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization through a competitive process to serve as the Authority for five years. The organization would need relevant cybersecurity standards experience, expertise and staffing. The proposal also calls for periodic evaluation of program effectiveness, business costs, participation, public awareness, impartiality and fairness, with findings reported to Congress.
Practical implications for industrial technology decisions
For plant and engineering teams, the proposal’s most useful lesson is to distinguish a security label from a complete assessment of operational risk. If a certification program of this kind is used in procurement, decision-makers would need to examine the certification class, applicable criteria, covered product or service, and current validity. They would also need to determine how the product fits the facility’s systems and requirements; the amendment does not provide a substitute for that site-specific work.
System integrators and technical buyers can prepare by asking suppliers to explain the evidence behind security claims, the standards or benchmarks used, the scope of any evaluation, and how component information is disclosed. These questions align with the proposal’s emphasis on harmonized criteria, accredited evaluation and transparent labeling without assuming that every product or supplier would participate.
Conclusion
The 2020 amendment outlined a voluntary approach to cybersecurity certification and labeling for critical information and communications technology. Its proposed elements—shared security criteria, accredited certifying agents, differentiated certification classes, product labels, public certification information and enforcement against false claims—highlight the importance of knowing what a security designation actually represents. For industrial automation decision-makers, the practical priority is to treat certification as one input to technology evaluation, and to verify its scope and supporting evidence before using it in procurement or risk decisions.