EMP protection is a critical infrastructure planning issue because industrial operations depend on interconnected electrical, electronic and communications systems. The 2017 report by the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack argues that electromagnetic events—whether manmade or natural—could disrupt infrastructure well beyond the initial point of impact. For plant managers, system integrators and reliability teams, its central operational lesson is to consider resilience across connected systems rather than treating protection as an isolated equipment problem.
The report presents a range of threats, including high-altitude nuclear EMP, non-nuclear EMP weapons, solar-driven geomagnetic disturbances, cyber-attacks and physical sabotage. Its recommendations reflect the report’s assessment and should be understood in that context. Across these scenarios, it emphasizes a shared vulnerability: modern infrastructure’s dependence on electronics and on services supplied by other infrastructure sectors.
Why EMP protection matters to industrial operations
Industrial facilities rely on electricity, communications, control systems and supply chains to maintain normal operations. The report identifies supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems as a common infrastructure element and describes the electric grid as the “keystone” on which many other critical services depend. A prolonged grid outage could therefore affect not just production equipment, but also communications, transportation, water, food supply and emergency services.
For automation professionals, this interdependence is important. A control system’s resilience cannot be assessed only by looking at its control-room hardware. The supporting power, communications links and external services also matter. If one service fails, dependent systems may be impaired; as disruptions persist, the recovery of one infrastructure can become dependent on the recovery of others.
The report also distinguishes EMP from a conventional blast-centered threat. In the high-altitude nuclear EMP scenario it describes, the immediate concern is disruption or damage to electrical and electronic systems over a broad area, rather than direct blast effects at ground level. It also discusses solar geomagnetic disturbances as a natural hazard that can affect power systems. The mechanisms differ, but the report recommends considering overlapping protections where practical.
Prioritize assets by consequence and recovery difficulty
Rather than attempting to protect every component at once, the report recommends a prioritized approach. Its proposed starting point is infrastructure that is both important and difficult or time-consuming to replace. It specifically gives nuclear reactors and spent-fuel storage facilities high priority, while also calling for protection of key grid components and telecommunications infrastructure.
For industrial organizations, this approach can inform a structured resilience review:
- Identify dependencies. Map which operations rely on grid power, telecommunications, control networks and other external services.
- Assess consequences. Determine which assets or services would create the greatest operational impact if unavailable.
- Consider recovery time. Give particular attention to equipment or infrastructure elements that are difficult to replace or restore.
- Connect protection to continuity planning. Assess how disruptions to power, communications or suppliers could affect safe operations and recovery.
These steps translate the report’s broad infrastructure priorities into planning questions without assuming that every facility faces the same exposure or requires the same measures.
Use an all-hazards approach to resilience
The report describes an “all hazards” strategy as a cost-effective way to address infrastructure risks. The idea is to consider measures that may help protect against multiple threats, including nuclear EMP, geomagnetic disturbances, electromagnetic interference, cyber-attacks, sabotage and severe weather. It also states that hardening technologies developed for military systems could be adapted for civilian infrastructure, although the appropriate measures depend on the systems being protected.
For engineers and integrators, this supports coordination between electrical protection, control-system design, cybersecurity and operational continuity planning. The report specifically recommends integrating EMP considerations into cybersecurity efforts for critical infrastructure. This does not mean that EMP protection and cybersecurity are interchangeable. Rather, the report treats them as related elements of a broader effort to improve infrastructure resilience.
Protection should also account for the connections between sectors. A facility may maintain its own equipment but still depend on an external grid, communications provider or transportation network. Planning that includes only assets under a company’s direct control can therefore miss important dependencies.
Address governance as well as technology
A recurring concern in the report is fragmented responsibility among government agencies, regulators and industry. It argues that divided authorities and limited coordination hinder national infrastructure protection, and recommends establishing a designated executive agent to lead the effort. It also calls for coordination across government and industry, alongside prioritized protection of grid and telecommunications infrastructure.
For operators, the practical implication is that technical safeguards need an organizational framework. Clear responsibilities, coordination with relevant infrastructure partners and plans for training and response all contribute to preparedness. The report recommends training, evaluation and “red teaming” to assess readiness, as well as planning for scenarios in which several interconnected services are disrupted.
Build resilience around dependencies and recovery
The report’s most useful message for industrial decision-makers is the need to connect hazard assessment with asset priority, infrastructure dependencies and recovery planning. EMP protection should not be considered solely a specialist electronics issue: the potential consequences described in the report extend to grid supply, SCADA, telecommunications and other systems that support industrial operations.
Facilities can use an all-hazards perspective to identify critical dependencies, prioritize hard-to-replace assets and coordinate protection with continuity plans. No single measure removes every risk, but a structured approach can help organizations make informed decisions about where resilience efforts matter most and how those efforts fit into the wider infrastructure on which reliable operations depend.