Healthcare cybersecurity findings published in 2018 offer a useful case study for industrial automation teams: adding security products does not, by itself, create a mature security program. The survey described organizations facing growing exposure from connected systems while struggling with limited budgets, staffing shortages, unclear objectives and reactive vendor selection. Although its data concerns healthcare providers, several of these management challenges also matter to industrial organizations integrating operational technology (OT), information technology (IT) and connected devices.
The figures below reflect the survey period, which ran from Q3 2017 to Q2 2018; they should not be read as a picture of current conditions. Their value lies in the patterns they identify and the practical questions they raise for security planning.
Healthcare cybersecurity findings point to a planning gap
Black Book Market Research surveyed more than 2,464 security professionals from 680 provider organizations. In the report, 96% of IT professionals agreed that attackers were outpacing their organizations. More than 90% of healthcare organizations had experienced a data breach since Q3 2016, and nearly half reported more than five breaches during that period.
Despite that exposure, respondents described limited investment and weak program foundations. The report said 88% of hospital representatives indicated that security budgets had remained level since 2016, while cybersecurity represented about 3% of annual IT spending. Sixty percent of healthcare enterprises had not formally defined security objectives and requirements in a strategic and tactical plan. A further 83% had not conducted a cybersecurity drill based on an incident response process.
For plant managers and engineering leaders, the implication is not that healthcare and industrial environments have identical risks. Rather, both settings need a deliberate process for defining what must be protected, who is responsible, and how teams will respond when controls fail. In industrial operations, that planning should account for the systems and devices that support production, as well as dependencies between enterprise networks and control environments.
Choose security controls around risk, not compliance alone
The survey found that 89% of respondents said their organization had purchased a cybersecurity solution to meet compliance requirements, rather than necessarily to reduce risk. It also reported that 74% of surveyed CIOs had not evaluated total cost of ownership before signing their current security contract. These results underline a procurement risk: purchasing a tool to satisfy a requirement is not the same as confirming that it addresses a specific threat or operational need.
A more disciplined selection process starts with a clear view of the threat landscape and the organization’s risk framework. Before evaluating vendors, teams can document:
- Security objectives: Which systems, information or operational processes require protection, and what outcomes should controls support?
- Required capabilities: Are the needs related to identity and access management, endpoint protection, monitoring, vulnerability assessment, incident response or another defined function?
- Operational constraints: How will a proposed control fit with existing systems and the requirements of the environment it protects?
- Ownership and measurement: Who will manage the solution, and how will the organization assess whether it is meeting its objectives?
The report also found that 92% of security product or service decisions since 2016 had been made at the C-level without involving users or affected department managers. In industrial settings, involving engineering, operations, IT and security stakeholders can help expose practical requirements before a contract is signed.
Account for staffing, incident readiness and vendors
Security staffing shortages were another theme. The report noted that 84% of hospitals had operated without a dedicated security executive in the previous year, and that some organizations turned to outsourcing or security-as-a-service as a stopgap. External specialists can provide support where internal expertise is limited, but the organization still needs defined responsibilities and a clear understanding of the services being purchased.
Preparation matters as much as procurement. In the survey, 58% of hospitals had not selected their current security vendor before a cybersecurity incident, and 32% had not scanned for vulnerabilities before an attack. Selecting support during an active incident can constrain due diligence and decision-making. Organizations can reduce that pressure by identifying response roles, escalation paths and potential external support in advance, then practicing the response process.
Third-party access also warrants attention. The source report described healthcare organizations as having limited visibility into smaller vendors with access to protected health information, and reported that 58% did not hold vendors accountable for meeting minimum acceptable security standards. Industrial organizations face a related governance question whenever contractors, integrators or suppliers can access systems or sensitive information: what access is necessary, what requirements apply, and how will compliance be checked?
Connected devices make security an operational concern
The report’s historical account of threats in 2017 included vulnerabilities affecting connected medical devices and attacks targeting industrial control systems. It mentioned Industroyer as an example of malware designed for specific types of control systems, while noting that assessments differed on how new such threats were. It also discussed insecure IoT communications and vulnerabilities in network-facing systems.
These examples reinforce the need to consider device security as part of system design and lifecycle management, not as a separate IT issue. Relevant practices include understanding which devices are connected, reviewing their security requirements, assessing vulnerabilities, and considering how access and communications are controlled. The survey also described layered security approaches using combinations of capabilities such as identity and access management, encryption, firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention, and security information and event management (SIEM). The appropriate mix depends on the organization’s requirements and risk assessment; the report does not establish one universal architecture.
Build a measurable, cross-functional program
Only 24% of providers in the survey reported that they did not conduct measurable cybersecurity assessments; among those that did assess their status, most relied on their own criteria. The report’s figures make a case for establishing repeatable measures and involving independent assessment where appropriate. For industrial teams, measurement should connect security work to defined operational and technical objectives, rather than relying only on a checklist or the number of products installed.
The practical lesson is to move from reactive purchasing toward planned, shared responsibility. Define security objectives, involve the people who operate and maintain affected systems, evaluate vendors against documented needs, prepare for incidents, and maintain visibility into third-party access and connected devices. These steps do not eliminate cyber risk, but they give decision-makers a more structured basis for prioritizing controls and assessing readiness across IT and operational environments.