Industrial policy is back in the debate over how to strengthen domestic manufacturing and protect critical supply chains. For manufacturers and industrial automation leaders, the discussion raises practical questions: Which capabilities are genuinely essential? How should governments support them? And how can policy avoid increasing costs for the very industries it aims to strengthen?
A 2020 policy memorandum by economist Douglas A. Irwin argues for a more focused approach. Rather than treating domestic production or self-sufficiency as goals across the board, policymakers should identify specific vulnerabilities, coordinate existing efforts, and weigh the effects of proposed support on manufacturers, trading partners, and the broader economy.
Industrial policy needs clear priorities and coordination
Government support for selected industries already exists in many forms, even when it is not described as industrial policy. The challenge, according to the memorandum, is that these efforts can be spread across agencies, developed on an ad hoc basis, or work at cross purposes. A dedicated office is not necessarily the answer: its value depends on whether it adds expertise and coordination rather than duplicating institutions already doing that work.
One proposed remedy is an interagency study of policies that could strengthen sectors important to technological capability, national security, or public health. The study would examine both the goals and feasibility of different approaches, and clarify priorities for government, business, and the public.
That assessment should not be limited to factories and physical production. The memorandum also points to research and development, regulatory standards, the digital economy, infrastructure such as the electricity grid, and stockpiles of essential goods or medical supplies. For industrial organizations, this broader scope matters: the resilience of a production system may depend on more than where a finished product is assembled.
Coordination is also an institutional question. The memorandum suggests abolishing the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, incorporating its functions into the National Economic Council, or reshaping it as a joint task force involving the Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, and Defense. The central principle is to assign responsibility where it can complement existing work.
Target critical sectors—not every industry
Defining priorities is difficult. If objectives such as economic security are left too broad, almost any domestic producer could argue that it deserves government support. That creates a risk that programs will benefit private interests without delivering a corresponding public benefit.
A more disciplined approach would identify a limited number of product segments or areas where additional domestic capacity is justified by clearly stated public-health or national-security needs. It would also consider whether the underlying concern is actually a shortage of manufacturing capacity, or whether it involves another issue, such as research investment, infrastructure, or standards-setting.
This distinction can help policymakers avoid treating every supply-chain dependency as an emergency. The memorandum cautions against pursuing broad national self-sufficiency, noting that US manufacturing is deeply connected to international trade and that supply relationships with neighboring countries and allies can be economically efficient. It cites North American automotive supply chains as an example of cross-border production that is not, by itself, a national-security threat.
For manufacturers, the implication is that resilience should not automatically be equated with producing everything domestically. The policy question is more specific: where could disruption create a serious public-health or security problem, and what form of response would address that vulnerability without unnecessarily undermining beneficial trade?
Why protectionism can hurt manufacturers
The memorandum distinguishes between promoting an industry and shielding it from competition. Tariffs may appear to support domestic producers, but they can also raise input costs for downstream manufacturers, invite retaliation against exports, and strain relationships with allies.
Steel tariffs illustrate the trade-off. While intended to protect domestic steel producers, higher domestic steel prices also affect manufacturers that use steel in products and infrastructure. The memorandum describes impacts on automobile, agricultural-equipment, construction, and other businesses, as well as consumers. In the cited analysis, one study estimated that steel users would pay an additional $5.6 billion for more expensive domestic steel. Another projected potential employment gains in steel and aluminum alongside larger employment losses elsewhere in the economy. These are estimates reported in the 2020 memorandum, not guarantees of outcomes for every trade measure.
Tariffs can also set off a chain reaction. Downstream companies may seek exemptions from duties on their inputs. If they do not receive them, they may seek protection of their own. This “cascading protection” can produce more trade restrictions, political lobbying, and retaliation. For industrial firms, the result may be less predictable access to inputs and more complex policy exposure.
Restrictions can create difficult trade-offs even when they target a sensitive technology. The memorandum notes that limiting exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to prevent technology transfer can also harm domestic industry and encourage China to develop its own capabilities. Policy intended to reduce one risk can therefore impose costs elsewhere.
Use support carefully and build in safeguards
When policymakers decide that a sector warrants support, the memorandum favors considering direct, temporary assistance—such as subsidies or other promotion measures—rather than relying on tariffs. Such support can avoid raising prices for industries that use the protected product and may be easier to end if it fails to meet its objectives.
Subsidies are not automatically effective or free of risk. Funding may be directed to companies or sectors for political reasons rather than public value. The memorandum cites a proposed pharmaceutical-manufacturing grant to Kodak as an example of the concerns that can arise. Any assistance therefore needs clear objectives and safeguards against policy capture by private interests.
For decision-makers assessing industrial-policy proposals, useful questions include:
- Is the sector tied to a clearly defined public-health, national-security, or technological objective?
- Does the identified vulnerability require more domestic production, or could another measure address it?
- How might the proposal affect input costs, downstream manufacturers, consumers, and exports?
- Can the support be evaluated and, if it does not work, ended?
- Could cooperation with allies address the concern without pursuing broad self-sufficiency?
Conclusion: Make industrial policy selective and accountable
Industrial policy can help address real concerns about critical capabilities and supply-chain vulnerabilities, but its design matters. Broad protectionism can raise costs, provoke retaliation, and spread restrictions across connected industries. A more considered approach begins with clearly defined priorities, coordinated government action, and a careful assessment of who benefits and who bears the costs.
For manufacturers, system integrators, and operations leaders, the practical takeaway is to distinguish targeted efforts to address a specific vulnerability from policies that broadly restrict trade. Effective policy should support essential capabilities without assuming that domestic self-sufficiency is always the answer—and should include safeguards to ensure public objectives remain central.