IoT device authenticity is a supply chain security concern with direct implications for connected operations. A counterfeit, tampered-with, or cloned device may contain an exploitable backdoor, giving an attacker a foothold even when network defenses are in place. If compromised devices are coordinated as a Botnet of Things, they can be used in attacks beyond the site where they were deployed—and can also disrupt local services, spoof data, or consume power and bandwidth.
A proposed approach combines a hardware-derived device identity with a permissioned blockchain. The hardware supplies a distinctive identifier; the ledger provides a shared record that manufacturers, distributors, and device owners can use to check whether a device has been registered. This distinction matters: blockchain can help protect and share identity records, but the identity must first be anchored to the physical device.
Why IoT supply chain security matters
Many IoT devices have limited memory and computing resources, which can constrain the security measures they can support. At the same time, manufacturing and distribution involve multiple organizations and locations. These conditions make it difficult for a buyer or operator to establish that a device is genuine and has not been altered before deployment.
A cloned or counterfeit device can enter through an untrusted supply chain and later be installed alongside legitimate equipment. If it contains malicious code or a concealed vulnerability, an adversary may be able to control it remotely. One device may seem like a limited risk, but a collection of compromised devices can become a botnet. Such a network can target external services with distributed denial-of-service traffic while also threatening the organization operating the devices.
For industrial teams, the practical issue is not only whether a device can communicate securely. It is also whether the hardware being connected is the device the organization intended to buy and deploy. Authenticity checks can therefore complement, rather than replace, network and firmware security controls.
How SRAM PUFs establish a device identity
The framework uses an SRAM-based physically unclonable function, or PUF, to derive an identity from small, inherent variations in how hardware is manufactured. Those variations produce a device-specific response intended to be unique and difficult to reproduce in another device. Because edge devices commonly include SRAM, the approach can use existing memory rather than requiring a separate identity component.
During registration, the manufacturer challenges the device’s PUF and obtains its response. The response is treated as the device ID, and a hash of that ID is prepared for recording. The manufacturer then submits a transaction containing the device type and hashed ID to the blockchain. Once accepted, the ledger contains a reference against which later checks can be made.
The hardware fingerprint is essential to the design. A ledger can preserve the integrity of records, but it cannot make a copied or easily altered identifier trustworthy by itself. By tying registration to a PUF response, the framework aims to make the identity harder to clone along with a product’s other data.
Using a permissioned blockchain for verification
The proposed system uses a permissioned blockchain, in which participating organizations are known and authorized. Manufacturers operate network nodes and use smart-contract logic, referred to in the implementation as chaincode, to manage device and device-type records. Policies can limit which manufacturers register particular device types or update their associated security information.
After a device changes hands, a distributor or owner can challenge its PUF, hash the resulting ID, and query an API connected to the blockchain. If the corresponding record exists, the query can return the registered device information; an absent record or an error indicates that the identity could not be verified through the framework. The verifier does not need to operate a blockchain node to perform this check.
Using a permissioned network also addresses concerns associated with public blockchain models in this application. The framework avoids public-chain transaction fees and resource-intensive Proof-of-Work mining. Its shared ledger is intended to make registered data traceable and resistant to undetected alteration, while keeping participation within an authorized supply chain group.
Beyond identity: maintaining security information
Authenticity does not mean a device is free of security weaknesses. A genuine product can still have a vulnerable firmware version or require an update. The framework therefore also allows manufacturers to maintain additional information associated with a device type, such as firmware details or security notices.
When a manufacturer updates this information, subsequent queries can return the updated record. This gives distributors and owners a potential channel for checking relevant security details alongside device identity. The approach does not itself install firmware updates or establish that a device is secure; it provides a way to record and retrieve information under the framework’s access rules.
What the prototype evaluation indicates
A proof-of-concept implementation used Hyperledger Fabric and Hyperledger Composer, with performance testing conducted using Hyperledger Caliper. In the reported test environment, a three-organization network with one peer per organization and a single orderer in Solo mode reached a peak throughput of 15.1 transactions per second with a block size of 30. With a transaction rate of 24 per second, the best reported latency was 3.14 seconds, also using a block size of 30.
These figures describe that prototype configuration, not a general production capacity guarantee. The evaluation identified the single Solo orderer as a throughput constraint and noted that Solo mode was intended for experimental use. Network design, deployment conditions, and the chosen ordering configuration should therefore be evaluated for any real implementation.
Practical implications for industrial teams
For system integrators and plant operators, this model offers a way to add identity checks to equipment procurement and onboarding. A deployment process could include verifying a device before it is connected to operational networks, while distributors could check devices as they move through the supply chain. Manufacturers, in turn, would need to participate in registration and maintain accurate device and security records.
The framework is best understood as one layer in a broader security strategy. It targets risks from counterfeit, tampered, or cloned hardware; it does not address every source of compromise, including malware or firmware flaws on otherwise legitimate devices. Organizations should assess how identity verification fits with their existing controls and how trusted participants, API access, and update responsibilities will be governed.
Combining SRAM PUF-based identity with a permissioned blockchain can give supply chain participants a shared method to register and check IoT devices. For industrial environments, the practical value is earlier detection of devices that lack a verifiable record, along with a channel for related security information. The approach can strengthen device onboarding and traceability, provided it is treated as a complement to—not a substitute for—ongoing firmware, network, and operational security.