Mergers and acquisitions can prompt litigation over whether shareholders received complete and accurate information before deciding how to respond to a transaction. In 2018, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Varjabedian v. Emulex Corp. changed one important part of that legal landscape: it held that a claim under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act requires a showing of negligence, rather than scienter. The ruling addressed the required state of mind, but did not resolve whether the disclosure at issue was materially incomplete.
Why M&A disclosure litigation shifted to federal courts
In 2016, the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholders Litigation restricted approval of disclosure-only settlements. Under the approach described in that decision, supplemental disclosures offered in connection with such settlements needed to be plainly material. The change was followed by an increase in federal lawsuits challenging disclosures made in M&A transactions.
These cases commonly alleged that transaction documents omitted or misstated information about financial projections, a financial advisor’s analyses, or conflicts of interest. Companies sometimes responded with additional disclosures, after which plaintiffs could seek dismissal and negotiate a fee award. Such suits often ended without a judicial decision on the underlying disclosure claims.
Varjabedian arose from the 2015 merger of Avago Technologies and Emulex Corporation. Avago’s tender offer valued Emulex shares at a 26.4% premium to the closing price before the deal announcement. Emulex’s board had received a financial advisor’s fairness opinion that included several valuation analyses, among them a review of premiums in 17 semiconductor transactions.
Section 14(e) negligence and the Emulex disclosure
Emulex’s recommendation statement referred to the fairness opinion and four of the advisor’s analyses, including discounted cash flow and historical stock trading. It did not mention the analysis of premiums paid in other transactions. Shareholders sued, alleging that the omission violated Section 14(e), which prohibits material misstatements and omissions, as well as fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative conduct, in connection with a tender offer.
The district court dismissed the claim because the plaintiffs had not pleaded scienter: a knowing or intentional state of mind. It relied on decisions from other federal appeals courts that had applied a scienter requirement to Section 14(e), reasoning in part from the statute’s similarity to SEC Rule 10b-5.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. Its analysis drew on two Supreme Court decisions:
- Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: The Supreme Court found a scienter requirement for Rule 10b-5 claims, but the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the result rested on language in the underlying statute concerning manipulation, deception, and contrivances. Section 14(e), it said, lacks comparable language.
- Aaron v. SEC: The Court held that Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act does not require scienter. Because that provision and Section 14(e) contain similar language concerning material misstatements and omissions, the Ninth Circuit considered the interpretation relevant.
Reading the decisions together, the panel held that plaintiffs could bring a Section 14(e) claim by alleging negligence. That conclusion departed from rulings in the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, which had required scienter. The result was a disagreement among federal appeals courts over the required mental state for this type of claim.
Materiality remained a separate hurdle
The reversal did not establish that the missing Premium Analysis was material or that the defendants were liable. The Ninth Circuit noted that the district court had not decided whether omitting the analysis was material in the context of the full transaction. It also observed that showing materiality could be difficult, referring to a demanding standard under which the conduct would need to be highly unreasonable and an extreme departure from ordinary care.
The recommendation statement included extensive information about the transaction and Emulex’s valuation. It also disclosed that the offer represented a 26.4% premium and that the financial advisor considered it within the range of premiums in comparable transactions. Although the omitted analysis reportedly showed a below-average premium, that result alone did not establish that the information would have materially changed the total mix available to shareholders.
This distinction matters when assessing disclosure claims: the standard of intent and the materiality of an alleged omission are separate questions. Lowering the required state of mind does not by itself demonstrate that an omitted item was important enough to make the disclosure misleading.
Implications for merger disclosures and litigation
For companies preparing tender-offer disclosures, the case underscores the need to assess what information is presented, how financial-advisor analyses are summarized, and whether omissions could alter the overall picture offered to shareholders. The decision does not mean every analysis considered by an advisor must automatically appear in a recommendation statement; the materiality of an omission depends on the context described in the opinion.
The ruling also came amid closer scrutiny of disclosure-only settlements. Federal courts had begun addressing concerns similar to those raised in Trulia, including whether supplemental disclosures justified settlement and fee awards. The Ninth Circuit’s discussion of materiality could therefore be relevant both to the merits of disclosure claims and to efforts to resolve them through additional disclosures.
Varjabedian marked a significant 2018 split over whether Section 14(e) requires scienter, but it left the central factual question in the case unresolved. For parties involved in M&A transactions, the practical lesson is to distinguish the pleading standard from the substance of the disclosure: even where negligence is sufficient to plead a claim, plaintiffs still must confront whether the allegedly omitted information was material in light of the complete transaction disclosure.