The semiconductor supply chain is a strategic consideration for industrial automation, not just a concern for consumer electronics. Chips support connected devices, computing, telecommunications and other technologies used across modern industry. Yet advanced chip manufacturing depends on specialized capabilities concentrated among a small number of companies and locations. A 2020 analysis of US-China technology tensions showed how this concentration can turn trade and export controls into risks for manufacturers, technology suppliers and global operations.
For automation engineers, system integrators and operations leaders, the central lesson is that semiconductor availability depends on more than chip design or demand. It also depends on access to advanced fabrication, manufacturing equipment, intellectual property and expertise distributed across international supply networks.
Why the semiconductor supply chain is a strategic bottleneck
Semiconductor production involves multiple connected stages, including research and development, design, wafer fabrication, assembly, testing and distribution. Companies across the ecosystem supply design tools, licensed intellectual property, raw materials, specialized manufacturing equipment and packaging services. A disruption or restriction at one stage can affect the ability to deliver finished chips.
Advanced fabrication is especially difficult to replicate. Building and operating a leading-edge fab requires substantial investment, specialized equipment and engineering expertise, as well as the ability to achieve reliable commercial production. As the cost and complexity of advancing to smaller process nodes increased, fewer companies remained capable of manufacturing at the industry’s leading edge.
The 2020 report identified Taiwan and South Korea as especially important locations for advanced production. At that time, TSMC and Samsung were manufacturing advanced chips in commercial volumes, while other manufacturers were working to reach comparable capabilities. This concentration made the global industry efficient in some respects, but it also meant that a limited number of facilities and geopolitical relationships mattered to a wide range of technology companies.
Advanced fabrication and China’s dependence on foreign capacity
The report described a gap between China’s ambitions in technology and its domestic ability to manufacture the most advanced semiconductors. Chinese companies had developed significant capabilities in areas such as 5G and mobile technology, but leading firms still relied on overseas fabs for cutting-edge chips. Huawei, for example, depended on TSMC to manufacture advanced processors designed by its subsidiary HiSilicon.
China had committed substantial government funding to develop its semiconductor industry. However, investment alone could not quickly close the gap. The report pointed to the cost of research and development, the challenge of installing and operating advanced equipment, and the shortage of experience in achieving high-volume production at leading process nodes.
Extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography illustrated the challenge. This manufacturing technology uses very short wavelengths of light to create finer circuit patterns. Producing chips at the smallest process nodes requires complex equipment and demanding manufacturing processes. The report noted that ASML was the sole commercial supplier of EUV lithography systems at the time, making access to the equipment a potential point of leverage in export controls.
Export controls connect chip access to geopolitics
In 2020, US restrictions targeted Huawei’s access to semiconductors manufactured using US technology. Because TSMC relied on technology with US origins, the rules affected its ability to supply chips to HiSilicon. The report characterized this as a major escalation: the restrictions reached beyond direct shipments from US companies and affected production by a foreign foundry.
Such measures can create uncertainty well beyond the company named in a regulation. Chip designers, foundries, equipment suppliers, packaging and testing providers, and manufacturers assembling electronic products may all need to assess how export controls apply to their activities. Companies may also reconsider their exposure to particular technologies or suppliers.
For industrial businesses, this dynamic underscores why supply-chain planning should account for the origins and dependencies behind critical electronic components. A component may be designed in one country, fabricated in another and rely on equipment or intellectual property from elsewhere. Geopolitical restrictions can therefore affect supply routes that appear geographically distant from a plant’s own operations.
What supply-chain bifurcation could mean for industry
The report warned that continued restrictions could encourage the development of separate “blue” and “red” technology supply chains associated with the United States and China. Companies might seek alternatives to technologies or suppliers that expose them to export-control risk. Governments, in turn, could promote domestic manufacturing through incentives and industrial policy.
Creating separate systems would be difficult. Semiconductor production relies on international expertise, specialized inputs and significant capital. The report anticipated that efforts to decouple would be costly and disruptive rather than a simple relocation of factories. It also noted that constraints on personnel, technology and investment could limit the emergence of two fully independent ecosystems.
For plant managers and technical decision-makers, the practical concern is not only whether chips are available today. It is also whether suppliers can continue to access the manufacturing capacity and technologies needed to produce them. This makes visibility into component dependencies and supplier relationships relevant to operational resilience.
Taiwan’s central role raises the stakes
Taiwan’s importance in advanced chip production gave it a prominent place in the US-China technology dispute. The report discussed US efforts to encourage TSMC to build an advanced manufacturing facility in Arizona while also restricting the company’s ability to supply Huawei. These developments placed pressure on firms to navigate commercial relationships across competing political priorities.
The analysis considered military conflict over Taiwan related to semiconductors unlikely, but identified other possible responses from Beijing, including retaliation against Western technology firms, greater investment in domestic industry and efforts to obtain expertise or intellectual property. It warned that a sharp deterioration in relations could unsettle global technology supply chains.
Planning for semiconductor supply-chain risk
Semiconductors are essential to the technology systems supporting connected industry, but access to advanced chips rests on a complex and geographically concentrated ecosystem. The 2020 analysis showed how export controls, investment policy and tensions involving the United States, China and Taiwan could affect that ecosystem.
Industrial organizations should treat semiconductor dependencies as part of broader technology and supply-chain risk management. Understanding where critical components are designed and fabricated, which technologies their production depends on, and how suppliers may be affected by restrictions can inform planning. The larger implication is clear: decisions about semiconductor policy and manufacturing capacity can reach far beyond the chip sector, influencing the availability and development of technologies used across industrial automation.