Access Official Technical PDF

Share Summary:LinkedInEmail

A machine safety risk assessment is the starting point for selecting safeguards that protect people without making routine operation and maintenance unnecessarily difficult. For machine builders, system integrators and plant teams, it connects the hazards present during real work tasks with the design decisions, safety devices and control functions used to reduce risk.

The process applies to new machinery and to equipment already in service. It should consider intended use, foreseeable tasks and the machine’s life cycle—not just its normal automatic production cycle. A well-defined assessment also gives the safety design a documented basis for verification and validation.

Start with the machine, its tasks and its hazards

Before choosing a light curtain, interlocked guard or safety controller, establish the scope of the assessment. Consider the space needed by operators, the machine’s environment and the stages of its life cycle, including setup, operation, cleaning, troubleshooting and maintenance. Identify who performs each task and how they may interact with hazardous areas.

Next, identify potential sources of harm for each task. Hazards may arise from moving mechanisms, unexpected start-up or access to a process area. The assessment should not assume that a machine is safe simply because it carries a conformity marking: users and employers also have responsibilities for safe use, and modifications may affect the existing protective measures.

For each identified hazard, estimate the risk and decide whether further reduction is required. EN ISO 12100 provides a framework for risk assessment and risk reduction; it does not prescribe one universal assessment method. The selected method should suit the machine and be applied consistently, with the reasoning and results documented.

Estimate risk to determine the required safety level

When a safety-related control function is needed, EN ISO 13849-1 uses the required Performance Level, or PLr, to express the level of reliability that function must achieve. Risk estimation commonly considers three factors:

  • Severity (S): the potential seriousness of an injury.
  • Frequency or exposure (F): how often, and for how long, a person is exposed to the hazard.
  • Possibility of avoidance (P): whether a person could avoid or limit harm if the hazardous event occurred.

The combination of these factors helps establish the PLr for an individual safety function. The result is not a single rating for an entire machine: different hazards and functions may have different requirements. For example, access protection for a fast-moving robot may call for a different level than a function associated with a lower-risk conveyor section. The assessment must determine the appropriate requirement for each case.

Performance Level and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) are related approaches to functional safety, but they are not interchangeable labels. EN ISO 13849-1 is technology-neutral and can be applied to safety solutions using different technologies. EN 62061 addresses safety-related electrical, electronic and programmable electronic control systems. The appropriate standard depends on the application, technology and applicable customer or regulatory requirements.

Apply the hierarchy of risk reduction

Protective measures should follow a priority order rather than relying on warnings as the first response. The hierarchy described in the source material is:

  1. Eliminate or reduce the hazard through machine design and construction.
  2. Move tasks outside the hazardous area where practicable.
  3. Use guards and safety devices, such as interlocked doors or light curtains.
  4. Support safe work with procedures, information and training.
  5. Use warnings, including signs or visual and audible indicators, where appropriate.

Designing out a hazard is preferable where feasible. If people must access an area, an interlocked guard or presence-sensing device may be appropriate, depending on the risk and the task. A camera or another approach that enables observation from outside the danger zone may also reduce the need for entry. The right choice depends on the application and must be checked against relevant requirements, including standards for guards, interlocking devices, safety distances and emergency-stop functions.

Production considerations matter, but they do not replace risk reduction. Practical access for clearing disturbances or setting up equipment can make a safety solution easier to use as intended. The assessment should consider all relevant work, so safeguards do not create avoidable pressure to bypass them.

Design and verify each safety function

Once the required safety functions are identified, define what each must do. Examples include monitoring a guard, detecting a person at an opening or initiating an emergency stop. A function can be analysed as connected subsystems: input devices, logic and output devices. A door switch, safety controller and monitored contactors, for example, may each contribute to the function that stops hazardous motion when a guard opens.

For each subsystem, the designer must account for factors that affect reliability. Under EN ISO 13849-1, these include the system structure or category, component reliability data such as MTTFd, diagnostic coverage, and measures addressing common-cause and systematic failures. If safety-related software is used, its specification, development, testing and validation also need appropriate attention.

Manufacturer-provided PL or PFHD data can reduce the need to calculate component values from scratch, but it does not remove the need to assess the complete safety function. Mechanical components such as switches and contactors may require application-specific consideration, including how frequently they operate. Where components are shared by multiple functions, their total expected use can matter.

After implementation, verify that the achieved PL is at least the required PLr, then validate that the safety function meets its specification. Validation should also address requirements not captured by a numerical calculation, such as correct implementation and suitable software validation. Changes to a machine should prompt a review of the risk assessment and the affected safeguards.

Make risk reduction practical and maintainable

A documented, task-based assessment gives engineering and operations teams a common reference for selecting safeguards, planning access and maintaining safety functions. It also helps distinguish the requirements of one function from those of another, particularly in production cells where a single device may affect several machines or zones.

The practical implication is straightforward: assess hazards before selecting components, prioritize design-based risk reduction, and verify every safety function against its own requirement. By treating risk assessment, control-system design and validation as connected activities, organizations can build safety measures that are both technically justified and workable throughout the machine’s operating life. Applicable standards and regulatory obligations should be confirmed for the machine’s location and intended use.

Access Official Technical PDF

About The Author