Safe Torque Off (STO) is a functional safety feature in many variable speed drives. When its enable signal is removed, the drive is prevented from generating torque in the motor. This can help machinery designers reduce the risk of unintended movement, for example when a guard is opened or another safety interlock is activated. But STO is one part of a safety-related control system—not a standalone guarantee that a machine is safe.
For engineers and system integrators, applying STO means understanding both the drive’s internal safety function and the wider system around it: the risk assessment, safety controller, wiring, required integrity level and the machine’s stopping behaviour.
How Safe Torque Off works in a drive
A variable speed drive controls motor torque by switching power semiconductor devices in its inverter to create the required electrical output. STO uses a separate, fail-safe hardware interface to prevent the switching commands from reaching the inverter’s power devices when the enable input is de-energised. As a result, the drive cannot produce torque under the defined safety function.
This differs from disabling the drive through ordinary software or a standard control command. A complex control system can have behaviours and failure modes that are difficult to account for in a safety function. STO is designed to provide a hardware-based means of preventing torque generation independently of those normal control operations.
In conventional arrangements, contactors can disconnect the motor from its supply. A safety-related design may require two contactors in series, with monitoring to detect a failure such as a welded contact. STO can provide an alternative means of preventing the drive from producing torque, avoiding some contactor-related issues, including the risk of interrupting drive output current at an unsuitable frequency.
What STO does—and what it does not do
STO provides a category 0 stop as defined by IEC 60204-1: power is removed from the motor, and the machine is generally left to coast to a stop. The actual movement after torque is removed depends on the machine and application.
STO does not provide braking. If the hazard assessment requires controlled deceleration, the machine must first be stopped using an appropriate control method before STO is activated. If braking itself is a safety requirement, the braking function must be provided by an independent, suitable safety arrangement. Drive braking should not be assumed to be safety-rated simply because the drive has STO.
STO also does not provide electrical isolation. It does not physically separate electrical connections or make the drive safe for access to electrical terminals. Maintenance and electrical work require the appropriate isolation procedures.
Nor should STO automatically be treated as an emergency stop. An emergency stop addresses unexpected situations in which a person needs to initiate a stop. STO may form part of an emergency-stop system where the applicable requirements allow it, but its suitability must be assessed for the specific machine. A safety interlock designed to prevent a foreseeable hazard has a different purpose.
Integrating STO into machinery safety
The machine manufacturer retains overall responsibility for the safety of the machine. The process begins with a risk assessment, which identifies hazards and determines the required safety-related control measures. Those requirements should be documented in a Safety Requirements Specification and allocated to the relevant components and subsystems.
STO is defined for drive systems by IEC 61800-5-2. Its safety capability can contribute to a complete safety-related control system, but the system’s integrity cannot be inferred from the drive alone. The designer must assess the full function—including sensors, safety controller, outputs, wiring and final elements—using the applicable standards.
Relevant machinery safety approaches include ISO 13849-1, which uses Performance Levels (PL), and IEC 62061, which uses Safety Integrity Levels (SIL). Drive STO data, such as probability of dangerous hardware failure, is combined with the corresponding information for the other parts of the safety function. Architecture and systematic failure controls also matter. A subsystem’s capability does not by itself establish the integrity of the complete machine function.
Single-channel, dual-channel and wiring considerations
A single-channel STO input may have a high-integrity design within the drive, while still being vulnerable to certain faults in the external circuit. For example, a wiring fault that unintentionally energises the input could enable the drive. The safety design must address this risk through suitable measures, which may include protected wiring, a self-testing safety-controller output, or a second independent means of disabling the machine.
Where supported by the drive, dual-channel STO provides two inputs controlled by separate safety outputs. This can allow the controller to disable the drive through the remaining channel if it detects a fault on one channel. Whether this architecture is appropriate depends on the required safety function and the complete system design.
Follow the drive’s technical documentation for terminal connections, input thresholds and return wiring. In particular, the STO signal return should be connected as specified using dedicated conductors. Wiring must ensure that external faults, voltage drops or leakage currents cannot raise the input above the level allowed for the required safety integrity. Compatibility with safety-controller digital outputs should also be confirmed, including the effect of test pulses and the combined electrical load when multiple drive inputs are connected in parallel.
Practical design checks
- Define the safety function: Specify the hazard to be controlled, the required stop behaviour and the target integrity before selecting components.
- Check machine motion: Determine whether coasting after torque removal is acceptable and whether a separate braking function is needed.
- Review the whole circuit: Assess sensors, controller outputs, wiring faults and any contactors or brakes as part of the complete safety function.
- Use product-specific data: Confirm the drive’s STO channel arrangement, input characteristics, wiring requirements and certified safety information in its technical guide.
- Plan validation: Verify that the implemented system meets its requirements under the applicable machinery safety standards.
Conclusion
Safe Torque Off gives machinery designers a drive-level method for preventing motor torque and can replace some conventional motor-disconnection arrangements. Its value depends on correct integration: STO does not brake a machine, provide electrical isolation or establish the safety of the complete system. A risk-based design, appropriate wiring, verified component data and validation of the full safety function are essential to using STO responsibly in industrial automation.