Semiconductor manufacturing equipment is a critical part of the global technology supply chain—and a key constraint on who can produce the most advanced computer chips. A 2020 policy analysis by Saif M. Khan and Carrick Flynn argues that access to specialized tools from the United States, Japan and the Netherlands shapes China’s ability to build and maintain advanced chip fabrication capacity. For industrial automation leaders, the analysis offers a useful case study in how concentrated equipment supply, technical expertise and policy decisions can influence manufacturing capacity across borders.
The paper’s figures and projections describe conditions and expectations as of 2019–2020; they should be read in that historical context. Its central point, however, is about the structure of advanced chip production: fabs depend on complex equipment that is difficult to replace, while building a competitive domestic supply chain takes more than investment alone.
Why advanced chips depend on specialized equipment
State-of-the-art chips support computing-intensive applications such as artificial intelligence, 5G, autonomous drones and supercomputing. Their performance and production economics are closely connected to transistor size: smaller transistors allow more computing elements to be packed into a chip. As manufacturing has advanced, the cost and complexity of producing these chips have increased.
That complexity is visible at the fab level. The analysis reports that state-of-the-art fabrication plants cost more than $10 billion to build, and that semiconductor manufacturing equipment can account for as much as 80% of fab construction costs. Equipment is not a single interchangeable category: chip production requires multiple specialized tools, and the most advanced processes depend on capabilities supplied by a relatively small number of firms.
Photolithography illustrates the concentration. The paper identifies ASML, based in the Netherlands, as the sole producer of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment at the time. EUV tools were described as necessary for mass-producing state-of-the-art chips. The analysis also notes that advanced lithography and other equipment types are supplied by companies concentrated in the United States, Japan and the Netherlands.
China’s fab capacity and the equipment gap
China had expanded its chipmaking capacity, supported by extensive government investment, but the 2020 analysis distinguished total capacity from the ability to produce advanced chips. Its estimates put Chinese firms at 15.2% of global fab capacity, but only 3% when capacity was adjusted for chip quality. For near-state-of-the-art chips—defined in the paper as 16 nm or smaller—China accounted for a still smaller share of quality-adjusted capacity.
The distinction matters for industrial decision-makers: installed capacity alone does not show what a facility can manufacture. Process capability, available tools and the experience needed to run production all affect the output a fab can achieve. The paper reported that China’s leading chipmaker, SMIC, had introduced limited 14 nm production, while remaining behind the leading manufacturers discussed in the analysis.
The authors argued that import access was a major factor in China’s progress. They also identified obstacles to building a fully domestic equipment industry, including the complexity of the tools, a shortage of experienced engineers, resource-allocation challenges and the advantages held by established suppliers. Their conclusion was that subsidies could accelerate investment but would not, by themselves, quickly replicate a complete, competitive equipment ecosystem.
Export controls as a supply-chain intervention
The paper proposes that the United States, Japan, the Netherlands and other relevant partners use tighter export controls on selected semiconductor manufacturing equipment. The goal, as presented by the authors, would be to limit China’s ability to expand advanced fab capacity while preserving chip supply for peaceful commercial uses through separate end-user and end-use controls.
One proposed priority was photolithography equipment capable of supporting production at 45 nm or below. The analysis also identifies other equipment categories where allied countries might coordinate controls. Its recommendations include presuming denial of certain export licenses and scrutinizing equipment supplied to foreign-owned fabs operating in China. These are policy proposals from the paper, not a description of current regulations.
The authors’ modeled scenario estimated that controls could reduce China’s share of global fab capacity from 15.2% to 10.6%, and its quality-adjusted share from 3% to 0.2%. Those figures depend on the paper’s assumptions, including limits on equipment maintenance and replacement over time. They should not be treated as observed outcomes or as a forecast independent of those assumptions.
Implications for manufacturers and equipment suppliers
For equipment makers, the argument is that restricting sales to one market need not automatically mean a lasting loss of global demand. If chip production shifts to fabs elsewhere, suppliers may serve different customers instead. The paper suggests that capacity could move toward the United States, Taiwan and South Korea, while also acknowledging potential near-term revenue effects for equipment companies exposed to the Chinese market.
For plant managers, operations leaders and system integrators, the broader lesson is the strategic importance of dependencies that sit upstream of a production line. Semiconductor fabs rely on specialized machines, servicing and technical know-how; these dependencies can affect where capacity can be sustained, not just where a facility is built. The paper also emphasizes that equipment restrictions alone do not replace coordination: the proposed approach depends on cooperation among countries that control important parts of the supply chain.
Its policy argument includes a further distinction between restricting production capability and restricting chip sales. The authors recommend that democracies continue supplying chips to China for peaceful commercial purposes, while using targeted end-use and end-user controls for military and surveillance applications. In their view, limiting domestic production capacity first would reduce the risk that broad chip restrictions simply encourage substitution by local fabs.
Conclusion: equipment access shapes manufacturing capacity
The analysis highlights how semiconductor manufacturing equipment can function as a strategic supply-chain chokepoint. Advanced fabs require large investments, specialized tools and accumulated production expertise, making equipment access a key factor in the development of chipmaking capability. For industrial decision-makers, the practical takeaway is to look beyond headline fab capacity and consider the equipment, maintenance and supplier relationships that make production technically sustainable. The paper’s proposed export controls remain a policy choice, but its account of equipment concentration shows why upstream dependencies matter to the resilience and location of advanced manufacturing.